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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
February 2006 Grand Jury

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIF.
LOS ANGELES

FILED

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.)
)
JOSEPH ARAM BABAJIAN,)
KYLE JOHN GRASSO,)
LILA RIZK, and)
L. SCOTT ROBINSON,)
)
Defendants.)

CR No. 07- **07-00755**
I N D I C T M E N T
[18 U.S.C. § 371: Conspiracy;
18 U.S.C. § 1344(1): Bank Fraud;
18 U.S.C. § 1014: Loan Fraud;
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1):
Money Laundering;
18 U.S.C. § 982, 21 U.S.C. § 853:
Criminal Forfeiture;
18 U.S.C. § 2: Aiding And Abetting
And Causing An Act To Be Done]

The Grand Jury charges:

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INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS

I. SUMMARY OF THE FRAUD

1. Beginning in about July 2000, and continuing through at least January 2003, defendants JOSEPH ARAM BABAJIAN, KYLE JOHN GRASSO, LILA RIZK, and L. SCOTT ROBINSON, working with Beverly Hills mortgage brokers, the brokers' employees and in-house escrow officer, a Westside mortgage banker, and others, perpetrated a scheme to defraud federally-insured lenders out of tens of millions of dollars by obtaining fraudulently inflated loans on expensive homes in exclusive California communities.

II. THE VICTIM LENDERS AND THEIR LOAN PRODUCTS

A. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB

2. During the times relevant to this Indictment:

a. The accounts and deposits of Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB ("Lehman") were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

b. Lehman made loans directly to home buyers and also bought home loans from other lenders after the other lenders had funded them. Lehman's lending agent was Aurora Loan Services ("Aurora"). Aurora established criteria to be applied for Lehman

to fund or purchase home loans, and approved or rejected home loan applications on behalf of Lehman.

c. Aurora received loan application packages from correspondents and mortgage brokers, among other sources. Correspondents were generally mortgage banking companies that gathered information from prospective borrowers and sent loan application packages to Aurora for review. After Aurora approved

1 the loans and Lehman committed to buy them, the correspondents
2 initially funded the loans and then sold them to Lehman.
3 Mortgage brokers also gathered information from prospective
4 borrowers and sent loan application packages to Aurora for review
5 through Aurora's mortgage broker division known as Broker Funding
6 Solutions ("BFS"). After Aurora approved loan applications sent
7 by mortgage brokers, Lehman funded the loans directly and paid
8 commissions to the mortgage brokers.

9 d. Aurora, on behalf of Lehman, offered no-document
10 home loans up to \$1,500,000. Home buyers applying for
11 no-document home loans generally did not have to disclose their
12 income, employment, assets, or tax returns. Aurora's
13 requirements for no-document home loans varied according to the
14 amount of the loan. For no-document home loans between \$650,000
15 and \$1,500,000, Aurora set the following general conditions,
16 among others:

17 i. The loan-to-value ratio ("LTV") could not
18 exceed 60%. That meant that the amount of the loan could not
19 exceed 60% of the value of the home. Aurora calculated the value
20 of the home as the lesser of the home's purchase price or
21 appraised value;

22 ii. Two independent appraisals of the home,
23 completed by state-certified appraisers, had to be included in
24 the loan application package; and

25 iii. The borrower had to have superior credit and
26 live in the home as the borrower's primary residence.

27

28

1 e. Aurora, on behalf of Lehman, also offered
2 limited-document home loans up to \$4,000,000. Home buyers
3 applying for limited-document home loans generally had to
4 disclose their income, employment, and assets, but not their tax
5 returns. Aurora's requirements for limited-document home loans
6 varied according to the amount of the loan. For limited-document
7 home loans between \$1,500,000 and \$4,000,000, Aurora set the
8 following general conditions, among others:

- 9 i. The LTV could not exceed 65%;
- 10 ii. Two independent appraisals of the home,
11 completed by state-certified appraisers, had to be included in
12 the loan application package; and
- 13 iii. The borrower had to have superior credit.

14 **B. GreenPoint Bank**

15 3. During the times relevant to this Indictment:

16 a. The accounts and deposits of GreenPoint Bank were
17 insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

18 b. GreenPoint Bank made loans to home buyers.
19 GreenPoint Bank's lending agent was GreenPoint Mortgage Funding,
20 Inc. ("GreenPoint Mortgage"). GreenPoint Mortgage established
21 criteria to be applied for GreenPoint Bank to fund home loans,
22 and approved or rejected home loan applications.

23 c. GreenPoint Mortgage received loan application
24 packages from mortgage brokers and mortgage bankers, among other
25 sources. Mortgage brokers and mortgage bankers gathered
26 information from prospective borrowers and sent loan application
27 packages to GreenPoint Mortgage for review. After GreenPoint
28

1 Mortgage approved the loan applications, GreenPoint Bank funded
2 the loans and paid commissions to the mortgage brokers and
3 mortgage bankers.

4 d. GreenPoint Mortgage offered limited-document home
5 loans up to \$1,000,000. Home buyers applying for
6 limited-document home loans generally had to disclose their
7 income, employment, and assets, but not their tax returns.
8 GreenPoint Mortgage's requirements for limited-document home
9 loans varied according to the amount of the loan. For
10 limited-document home loans between \$650,000 and \$1,000,000, the
11 LTV could not exceed 65%, although GreenPoint Mortgage could
12 grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis. GreenPoint Mortgage
13 calculated the value of the home as the lesser of the home's
14 purchase price or appraised value.

15 e. GreenPoint Mortgage also offered second mortgage
16 home loans up to \$100,000, in the form of home equity lines of
17 credit ("HELOCs"). GreenPoint Mortgage offered HELOCs in
18 conjunction with limited-document first home loans. A home buyer
19 applying for a HELOC over \$100,000 had to seek and obtain an
20 exception from GreenPoint Mortgage. On HELOCs funded in
21 conjunction with limited-document first home loans between
22 \$650,000 and \$1,000,000, the combined loan-to-value ratio
23 ("CLTV") could not exceed 75%, although GreenPoint Mortgage could
24 grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis. That meant that the
25 combined amounts of the first home loan and the HELOC could not
26 exceed 75% of the value of the home, calculated as the lesser of
27 the home's purchase price or appraised value.

1 f. For loans with a CLTV over 75% on homes valued
2 between \$650,000 and \$1,000,000, GreenPoint Mortgage required one
3 appraisal completed by a state-licensed appraiser.

4 GreenPoint Mortgage also required one field review of the initial
5 appraisal, completed by a different appraiser.

6 g. GreenPoint Mortgage did not offer 100% financing
7 to home buyers. That meant that GreenPoint Mortgage offered no
8 loan product or combination of loan products by which a home
9 buyer could borrow 100% of the value of the home. GreenPoint
10 Mortgage made no exceptions to this rule.

11 **III. THE MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE**

12 4. During the times relevant to this Indictment:

13 a. The Combined Los Angeles/Westside Multiple Listing
14 Service, Inc. ("the MLS") was a non-profit company owned and
15 operated by professional associations of real estate agents in
16 Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Malibu, and other Southern California
17 communities. The MLS' operating budget came from dues paid by
18 its members. Members of the MLS included licensed real estate
19 agents, licensed real estate appraisers, and others in the
20 real estate profession.

21 b. The main service provided by the MLS was an
22 on-line electronic database of listings of homes for sale.
23 Real estate agents representing home sellers ("sellers' agents")
24 used the MLS database to advertise their listings and provide
25 information about the homes. Real estate agents representing
26 home buyers ("buyers' agents") used the MLS database to search
27 for homes for their clients. Real estate appraisers used the
28

1 MLS database to, among other things, search for properties
2 comparable in size, price, location, and other features, to the
3 subject homes being appraised.

4 c. The MLS made changes to sellers' agents' listings
5 in the MLS database upon the sellers' agents' request.

6 Additionally, real estate agents gained access to and used the
7 MLS database from computer terminals at the agents' own offices.

8 This access enabled sellers' agents to make changes to their
9 listings in the MLS database, and buyers' agents to search the

10 MLS database for listings. The MLS permitted real estate

11 agencies to delegate to the agencies' staff the task of

12 electronically entering and changing listing data in the

13 MLS database. However, MLS policy held sellers' agents, not

14 their agencies' staff, responsible at all times for the accuracy

15 and timeliness of their listings in the MLS database. The MLS

16 enforced this policy through random audits of listings,

17 assessments and fines imposed on sellers' agents, and compliance

18 classes, among other means.

19 d. The MLS database provided the following
20 information, among other information, about homes for sale:

21 i. The list price, which was the price sought by
22 the seller of the home;

23 ii. Any changes to the list price;

24 iii. The date of the listing;

25 iv. The names of the seller's agents;

26 v. The number of days that the home was on the
27 market;

1 vi. Whether the listing had been withdrawn from
2 the MLS database;

3 vii. Whether a home was put back on the market for
4 sale;

5 viii. Whether the seller had accepted an offer to
6 purchase the home. Sellers' agents used the term "pending" to
7 show that the seller had accepted an offer; and

8 ix. Whether the home was sold, and if so, when
9 and for what price.

10 **IV. THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR CO-CONSPIRATORS**

11 **A. The Real Estate Agents: Defendants JOSEPH ARAM BABAJIAN**
12 **and KYLE JOHN GRASSO**

13 5. Defendants JOSEPH ARAM BABAJIAN and KYLE JOHN GRASSO
14 are, and during the times relevant to this Indictment were,
15 real estate agents licensed by the State of California,
16 Department of Real Estate. From no later than 2000 through the
17 date of this Indictment, defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO worked
18 together representing sellers and buyers of homes in exclusive
19 Southern California communities, including Beverly Hills,
20 Bel Air, Holmby Hills, and the Westside of Los Angeles.

21 When their clients sell and buy homes, defendants BABAJIAN and
22 GRASSO receive commissions, generally calculated at about 3% to
23 6% of the sale prices of the homes.

24 6. During the times relevant to this Indictment,
25 defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO were the sole owners of
26 FSC Ventures, Inc. ("FSC Ventures"), a California corporation
27 incorporated on or about December 15, 2000. Defendant BABAJIAN
28 owned 70%, and defendant GRASSO owned 30%, of FSC Ventures.

1 Defendant BABAJIAN was the President and Chief Executive Officer.
2 Defendant GRASSO was the Secretary, Treasurer, and Chief
3 Financial Officer.

4 7. From no later than 2000 through about January 2001,
5 defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO worked together as independent
6 contractors with Fred Sands Realtors ("Fred Sands"), a major
7 real estate agency in the Los Angeles area. Defendants BABAJIAN
8 and GRASSO worked at the Fred Sands Beverly Hills branch office.
9 Defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, working together, were
10 Fred Sands's top-producing real estate agents, measured by the
11 commissions they generated and the aggregate prices of the homes
12 their clients sold and bought.

13 8. Fred Sands had a business affiliation with
14 Progressive Title Company ("Progressive Title"). In home
15 purchases, Progressive Title sold title insurance policies
16 protecting lenders against covered losses arising from
17 undisclosed, earlier-recorded ("senior") liens and mortgages on
18 the homes. Progressive Title also sold title insurance policies
19 protecting home buyers against covered losses arising from
20 defects in or unmarketability of the title conveyed to them.

21 9. In about January 2001, defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO
22 left Fred Sands and became independent contractors with
23 Prudential California Realty ("Prudential"), a major real estate
24 agency in Southern California. Prudential was a member of
25 The Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. ("PREA"), a
26 nationwide network of real estate agencies. Defendants BABAJIAN
27 and GRASSO joined Prudential's Beverly Hills branch office.

28

1 10. In 2001, the principals of Prudential owned Pickford
2 Holdings, LLC ("Pickford Holdings"), which in turn held an
3 ownership interest in California Title Company ("Cal Title").
4 In home purchases, Cal Title sold the same kinds of title
5 insurance policies for lenders and buyers that Progressive Title
6 sold.

7 11. In return for defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO joining
8 Prudential, Prudential gave defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO,
9 through FSC Ventures, the following forms of compensation, among
10 others:

11 a. A limited partnership interest in:

12 i. All but two Prudential branch offices in
13 Los Angeles County; and

14 ii. All Prudential branch offices in
15 Santa Barbara, Montecito, and Santa Ynez, California;

16 b. An 85% share of all commissions up to \$2,000,000
17 generated annually by defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, and a
18 94% share of all commissions over \$2,000,000 generated annually
19 by them; and

20 c. An ownership interest in Pickford Holdings, plus

21 an option to acquire an additional ownership interest in
22 Pickford Holdings. Through these ownership interests, defendants
23 BABAJIAN and GRASSO acquired an indirect ownership interest in
24 Cal Title.

25 12. In 2001, defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, working
26 together, were among Prudential's top-producing real estate
27 agents, measured by the commissions they generated. In 2002,
28

1 defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, working together, were PREA's
2 top-producing real estate agents nationwide. In 2003, defendants
3 BABAJIAN and GRASSO, working together, were Prudential's
4 second-highest producing real estate agents.

5 13. Beginning around the time that defendants BABAJIAN and
6 GRASSO joined Prudential, and continuing through all other times
7 relevant to this Indictment, defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO
8 collected their real estate agents' commissions through
9 FSC Ventures. Escrow companies handling transactions in which
10 clients of defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO bought and sold homes
11 typically made defendant BABAJIAN's and defendant GRASSO's
12 commission checks payable to FSC Ventures. Defendant BABAJIAN
13 generally collected 70%, and defendant GRASSO generally collected
14 30%, of these commissions.

15 14. In about February 2002, the principals of Prudential
16 sold Prudential and Pickford Holdings to Home Services of
17 California, Inc. ("Home Services"). Beginning in June 2002, in
18 order to buy out FSC Ventures' ownership interests in Prudential
19 and Pickford Holdings and accomplish the sale of those entities
20 to Home Services, Prudential paid \$3,500,000 to defendant
21 BABAJIAN and \$1,500,000 to defendant GRASSO.

22 **B. The Appraisers: Defendants LILA RIZK and**
23 **L. SCOTT ROBINSON**

24 15. During the times relevant to this Indictment,
25 defendants LILA RIZK and L. SCOTT ROBINSON were real estate
26 appraisers based in Orange County, California. Defendants RIZK
27 and ROBINSON were licensed by the State of California, Office of
28 Real Estate Appraisers. To obtain and maintain their licenses,

1 defendants RIZK and ROBINSON each had to pass an examination and
2 meet certain educational, training, and experience requirements
3 established by California law and by the Appraiser Qualifications
4 Board of the Appraisal Foundation.

5 16. Defendant RIZK had a Certified Residential License,
6 which permitted her to appraise all residential properties from
7 one to four units, including single-family homes of any value.
8 Defendant ROBINSON, however, had only a Residential License,
9 which permitted him to appraise only non-complex residential
10 properties from one to four units, up to a transaction value of
11 \$1,000,000. For properties with transaction values higher than
12 \$1,000,000, defendant ROBINSON was required to work with or
13 obtain the concurrence of an appraiser with a Certified
14 Residential License.

15 **C. The Mortgage Brokers, Their Employees,**
16 **And Their In-House Escrow Officer**

17 17. In about 1995, co-conspirator Mark Alan Abrams and
18 others started Desert Pacific Financial, Inc. ("DPF"), a mortgage
19 brokering company in Palm Desert, California. Abrams was
20 President of DPF. Abrams moved DPF to Irvine in about 1996 or
21 1997, and then to Beverly Hills by no later than about February
22 or March 2000. DPF sent loan application packages to lenders for
23 review and funding. DPF did not itself fund loans, but received
24 commissions from lenders when loans closed.

25 18. In the 1990s, co-conspirator Charles Elliott Fitzgerald
26 was a residential real estate developer in Southern California.
27 In the late 1990s, defendant BABAJIAN introduced Fitzgerald to
28 Abrams. In late 1999 or early 2000, Fitzgerald became Abrams'

1 business partner in DPF. Together, Fitzgerald and Abrams
2 expanded into residential real estate development and also
3 continued to send loan application packages to lenders. In or
4 about late 2001, Fitzgerald and Abrams began operating their
5 mortgage brokering company under the name Beverly Hills Estates
6 Funding, Inc. ("BHEF").

7 19. Over time, Fitzgerald and Abrams separately or together
8 came to control various trusts, partnerships, and corporations
9 (the "DPF/BHEF-related entities"). One of the main
10 DPF/BHEF-related entities controlled by Fitzgerald and Abrams was
11 PTD Partners, LLC ("PTD Partners"). Fitzgerald was the manager
12 of PTD Partners. The other members of PTD Partners were the
13 CTR Irrevocable Trust and the DPF Irrevocable Trust. Fitzgerald
14 controlled the CTR Irrevocable Trust. Abrams controlled the
15 DPF Irrevocable Trust.

16 20. From no later than 2000 through at least June 2003,
17 co-conspirators Nicole LaViolette and Jamieson Todd Matykowski
18 worked at DPF/BHEF. LaViolette was a loan processor who assisted
19 borrowers in gathering documents and completing forms, sent
20 loan application packages to lenders on behalf of borrowers, and
21 responded to lenders' requests for additional information about
22 proposed home loans. Matykowski's responsibilities included
23 scouting homes and negotiating with sellers' agents on behalf of
24 Fitzgerald and Abrams to buy homes. LaViolette and Matykowski
25 reported to Fitzgerald and Abrams.

26 21. By early 2000, Fitzgerald and Abrams opened
27 Platinum Escrow, a DPF/BHEF in-house escrow company in
28

1 Beverly Hills. Fitzgerald and Abrams later opened additional
2 DPF/BHEF in-house escrow companies, including Estates Escrow and
3 Star Escrow in Beverly Hills. From no later than 2000 through at
4 least June 2003, co-conspirator Timothy Holland, who had been
5 working for Fitzgerald and Abrams as a loan processor, was the
6 in-house escrow officer for Platinum Escrow, Estates Escrow,
7 Star Escrow, and the other DPF/BHEF in-house escrow companies
8 controlled by Fitzgerald and Abrams. Holland reported to
9 Fitzgerald and Abrams.

10 **D. The Mortgage Banker**

11 22. From 1999 through at least November 2000, ACF Partners
12 was a California general partnership that did business as
13 Americorp Funding ("Americorp"), a mortgage banking company with
14 offices on the Westside of Los Angeles and in Pasadena,
15 California. Americorp originated, brokered, funded, and sold
16 home loans. Co-conspirator Richard A. Maize was a co-founder of
17 and original partner in Americorp.

18 23. From no later than about July 2000 through at least
19 January 2001, Americorp was a correspondent and mortgage broker
20 that sent loan application packages to Aurora, GreenPoint
21 Mortgage, and other lenders for review. In its capacity as a
22 correspondent, Americorp funded loans after other lenders
23 approved and committed to buy them, and then sold the loans to
24 those lenders. In its capacity as a mortgage broker, Americorp
25 sent loan application packages to lenders for review and funding,
26 and received commissions from lenders when loans closed.

1 24. In about December 2000 and January 2001, Maize and his
2 partners sold Americorp to Prism Mortgage Company ("Prism").
3 Prism made Americorp a new division of a Prism subsidiary.
4 Maize became the President of the new Americorp division of the
5 Prism subsidiary. Prism continued to operate Americorp as a
6 mortgage banking company. Even after Prism bought Americorp,
7 Americorp remained a correspondent for Aurora and continued to
8 send loan application packages to Aurora for review. After
9 Aurora approved the loans and committed to buy them, Prism
10 initially funded the loans and then sold them to Aurora.

11 **V. OVERVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT**

12 25. Beginning in about July 2000, and continuing through at
13 least January 2003, defendants BABAJIAN, GRASSO, RIZK, and
14 ROBINSON, working with co-conspirators Fitzgerald, Abrams, Maize,
15 LaViolette, Matykowski, Holland, and others, perpetrated a
16 sophisticated and far-reaching scheme to cheat federally-insured
17 lenders into unwittingly funding tens of millions of dollars in
18 fraudulently inflated loans on high-end homes in exclusive
19 California communities. By supplying false documentation,
20 including bogus purchase contracts and appraisals, the defendants
21 and their co-conspirators deceived the victim lenders into
22 believing that the loans were adequately secured by the homes'
23 market values, when in fact the loans were greater than the
24 homes' true purchase prices and true market values. As described
25 further below, as part of this course of criminal conduct:

26 a. Defendants GRASSO, RIZK, and ROBINSON, Fitzgerald,
27 Abrams, Maize, LaViolette, and other conspirators targeted
28

1 Aurora's and GreenPoint Mortgage's loan products in order to
2 submit fraudulently inflated loan application packages.

3 b. Defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, Fitzgerald,
4 Abrams, and Matykowski found homes for sale in exclusive
5 neighborhoods that defendant GRASSO, Fitzgerald, and Abrams could
6 purchase by obtaining inflated loans.

7 c. Defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, as buyers' agents
8 representing Fitzgerald, Abrams, and defendant GRASSO himself,
9 made offers on behalf of Fitzgerald, Abrams, and defendant GRASSO
10 to buy homes from the original sellers at their true market
11 values. Matykowski also made such offers on behalf of Fitzgerald
12 and Abrams.

13 d. Defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, as buyers' agents
14 representing Fitzgerald and Abrams, negotiated purchase contracts
15 that required the original sellers and their agents to keep the
16 true purchase prices of the homes confidential -- including by
17 hiding and concealing information about the purchases in the
18 MLS database -- so that the victim lenders would not learn that
19 the conspirators were buying the homes for prices far less than
20 the prices reported in the loan application packages. Matykowski

21 also negotiated such purchase contracts on behalf of Fitzgerald
22 and Abrams.

23 e. Defendant GRASSO, Fitzgerald, Abrams, LaViolette,
24 and other conspirators fabricated inflated purchase contracts for
25 the homes at prices far higher than the homes' true purchase
26 prices. On homes bought by Fitzgerald and Abrams, the inflated
27 purchase contracts were in the names of Fitzgerald and straw
28

1 borrowers. On defendant GRASSO's home, the inflated purchase
2 contract was in defendant GRASSO's name.

3 f. Defendants RIZK and ROBINSON inflated appraisals
4 of the homes so that the homes would appear to be worth far more
5 than their true values. Defendant ROBINSON misappropriated the
6 name of an appraiser with a Certified Residential License on
7 defendant ROBINSON's appraisals.

8 g. In order to make the inflated appraisals appear
9 legitimate to the victim lenders, defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO
10 provided defendants RIZK and ROBINSON with information on homes
11 that supposedly were comparable to the subject homes being
12 appraised, but which in fact had sold or were listed for millions
13 of dollars more than the true purchase prices of those subject
14 homes.

15 h. Defendants BABAJIAN, GRASSO, RIZK, and ROBINSON,
16 Fitzgerald, Abrams, Maize, LaViolette, and other conspirators
17 sent, caused to be sent, and aided and abetted the sending of
18 false and fraudulent loan application packages to the victim
19 lenders, including the inflated purchase contracts and the
20 inflated appraisals. The loan application packages falsely made

21 it appear to the victim lenders that defendant GRASSO,
22 Fitzgerald, and the straw borrowers were buying the homes at
23 prices far higher than their true purchase prices. This in turn
24 falsely made it appear that the LTVs and CLTVs would not exceed
25 the victim lenders' maximum ratios. In reality, defendant
26 GRASSO, Fitzgerald, and Abrams were buying the homes at their
27 true market values, such that the LTVs and CLTVs would exceed
28

1 those ratios.

2 i. Defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO, Fitzgerald,
3 Abrams, Maize, LaViolette, Holland, and other conspirators used
4 the DPF/BHEF in-house escrow companies in the transactions in
5 which they obtained inflated loans, so that the victim lenders
6 would not learn that the conspirators were buying the homes for
7 prices far less than the prices reported in the loan application
8 packages.

9 j. On at least one home where defendants BABAJIAN and
10 GRASSO also represented the original seller as seller's agents,
11 and thereby controlled the listing of the home in the
12 MLS database, defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO manipulated,
13 fabricated, and falsified the MLS database information about the
14 home, including by inflating the purchase price and falsifying
15 the description of the home.

16 k. Defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO exploited
17 Fred Sands's business affiliation with Progressive Title, and
18 Prudential's business affiliation with Cal Title, to help obtain
19 title insurance policies up to the full amounts of the inflated
20 loans. The victim lenders would not fund or buy the loans

21 without such title insurance policies. Defendants BABAJIAN and
22 GRASSO, using their connections to Cal Title, demanded and
23 received from Abrams and Fitzgerald concealed, outside-of-escrow
24 payments in transactions funded by inflated loans insured by
25 Cal Title, even where defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO represented
26 neither seller nor buyer, had no role in the transactions, and
27 were entitled to no money from them.

28

1 26. Relying on the false documentation in the loan
2 application packages, including the inflated purchase contracts
3 and the inflated appraisals, the victim lenders funded and bought
4 loans on the inflated purchases. Because the packages contained
5 false and fraudulent information, the victim lenders did not know
6 that the loans were actually greater than the true purchase
7 prices of the homes.

8 27. The conspirators profited from the inflated loans in
9 the following ways, among others:

10 a. Fitzgerald and Abrams got millions of dollars and
11 control of most of the homes;

12 b. Defendant GRASSO got a Beverly Hills home without
13 putting any of his own money down;

14 c. Defendants BABAJIAN and GRASSO got hundreds of
15 thousands of dollars in real estate agents' commissions and
16 concealed, outside-of-escrow payments on homes bought by
17 Fitzgerald and Abrams;

18 d. Defendants RIZK and ROBINSON got hundreds of
19 thousands of dollars in inflated appraisal fees;

20 e. Maize got hundreds of thousands of dollars in
21 kickbacks; and

22 f. LaViolette, Matykowski, and Holland got salaries,
23 bonuses, commissions, and other benefits.