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FILED

FEB 1 1 2011

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

211-9-0070 JAM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

PLEA AGREEMENT

CR. NO.

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COLLINS MAX CHRISTENSEN, aka Collie Christensen,

Defendant.

I'.

INTRODUCTION

A. Scope of Agreement: The United States Attorney charged defendant Collins Max Christensen in an Information with one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. This document contains the complete Plea Agreement ("Plea Agreement") between the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California (the "government") and the defendant. This Plea Agreement is limited to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California and cannot bind any other federal, state, or local prosecuting, administrative, or regulatory authorities.

B. Court Not a Party: The Court is not a party to this Plea Agreement. Sentencing is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court, the Court is under no obligation to accept any recommendations made by the government, and the Court may in its discretion impose any sentence it deems appropriate up to and including the statutory maximum stated in this Plea Agreement. If the Court should impose any sentence up to the maximum established by the statute, the defendant cannot, for that reason alone, withdraw his guilty plea, and he will remain bound to fulfill all of the obligations under this Plea Agreement. The defendant understands that neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the Court can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence he will receive.

PLEA AGREEMENT

II.

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

- A. Waiver of Indictment and Guilty Plea: The defendant will waive indictment by grand jury, waive venue, and plead guilty to an Information, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B, charging him with one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \$ 1343. The defendant agrees that he is, in fact, guilty of those charges and that the facts set forth in the Factual Basis attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and accurate.
- B. Restitution: The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act requires the Court to order restitution to the victims of certain offenses. By signing this Agreement, the defendant also agrees to the payment of restitution to the victim(s) of his crime, for up to the full amount of loss caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct. The amount of restitution, if any, will be determined by the Court.

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Defendant agrees to pay restitution on a schedule to be recommended by the United States Probation Office. Defendant further agrees that he will not seek to discharge any restitution obligation or any part of such obligation in any bankruptcy proceeding.

- C. Fine: In light of the need to put substantial resources toward restitution of victims of his offense, the government will not recommend the defendant also pay a criminal fine.
- D. Special Assessment: The defendant agrees to pay a special assessment of \$100 at the time of sentencing by delivering a check or money order payable to the United States District Court to the United States Probation Office immediately before the sentencing hearing. The defendant understands that this Plea Agreement is voidable by the government if he fails to pay the assessment prior to that hearing. If the defendant is unable to pay the special assessment at the time of sentencing, he agrees to earn the money to pay the assessment, if necessary by participating in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

III.

THE GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATIONS

A. Recommendations:

- 1. Incarceration Range: The government will recommend that the defendant be sentenced to the low end of the applicable guideline range for his offense consistent with the stipulations of this Plea Agreement.
- 2. Acceptance of Responsibility: If the United States
 Probation Office determines that a three-level reduction in
 defendant's offense level for his full and clear demonstration of
 acceptance of responsibility is appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,

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the government will not oppose such a reduction and will so move under §3E1.1(b), so long as the defendant pleads guilty, meets with and assists the probation officer in the preparation of the presentence report, is truthful and candid with the probation officer, and does not otherwise engage in conduct that constitutes obstruction of justice within the meaning of U.S.S.G § 3C1.1, either in the preparation of the pre-sentence report or during the sentencing proceeding.

B. Limitation on Use of Information For Sentencing: Other than as set forth above, the government agrees that any incriminating information provided by the defendant during his cooperation will not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8.

IV.

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE

A. Elements of the Offense: At a trial, the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements of wire fraud, to which the defendant is pleading guilty:

First, the defendant knowingly participated in:

(A) a scheme and artifice to defraud, or (B) in a plan for obtaining money or property by making false promises or statements;

Second, the defendant knew that the scheme was misleading or that the promises or statements were false;

Third, the scheme, and/or the promises or statements, were material; that is, they had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, a person to part with money or property;

Fourth, the defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and Fifth, the defendant used, or caused to be used, the interstate

wires in furtherance of the scheme.

MAXIMUM SENTENCE

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A. Maximum Penalty: For wire fraud, the maximum sentence that the Court can impose is twenty years imprisonment, a \$250,000 fine, a three year period of supervised release, and a special assessment of \$100. By signing this Plea Agreement, the defendant also agrees that the Court can order the payment of restitution for the full loss caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct. The defendant agrees that the restitution order is not restricted to the amounts alleged in the specific counts to which the defendant is pleading guilty. The defendant further agrees that he will not attempt to discharge in any present or future bankruptcy proceeding any restitution imposed by the Court.

B. Violations of Supervised Release: The defendant understands and agrees that if he violates a condition of supervised release at any time during the term of supervised release, the Court may revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve up to two additional years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).

VI.

SENTENCING DETERMINATION

A. Statutory Authority: The defendant understands that the Court must consult the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (as promulgated by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998, and as modified by <u>United States v. Booker</u> and <u>United States v. Fanfan</u>, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), <u>Rita v. United States</u>, 127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007), <u>Gall v. United States</u>, 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007), <u>Kimbrough</u>

v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007)) and must take them into 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

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account when determining a final sentence. The defendant understands that the Court will determine a non-binding and advisory guideline sentencing range for this case pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant further understands that the Court will consider whether there is a basis for departure from the guideline sentencing range (either above or below the guideline sentencing range) because there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines. The defendant further understands that the Court, after consultation and consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines, must impose a sentence that is reasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

- B. Stipulations Affecting Guidelines Calculation: government and the defendant agree that there is no material dispute as to the following sentencing guidelines variables and therefore stipulate to the following:
 - 1. Base Offense Level: The base offense level is 7, under U.S.S.G. \S 2B1.1(a)(1).
 - 2. Loss: The loss figure foreseeable to defendant Christensen is approximately \$985,994, which adds 14 points under §\$2B1.1(b)(1)(J), 1B1.3.
 - 3. Number of Victims: The parties stipulate and agree that the offense involved ten or more victims, so a two-level adjustment applies under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A).
 - Adjusted Offense Level: 23.
 - Acceptance of Responsibility: After acceptance of

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responsibility (subject to paragraph III(A)(2), above), the offense level is 20.

- 6. Criminal History: The parties agree that the defendant's criminal history will be determined by the Probation Officer's score of the defendant's criminal history under Chapter Four of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
- 7. Departures: The parties stipulate and agree that they will not seek or argue in support of any other specific offense characteristics, Chapter Three adjustments (other than the decrease for "Acceptance of Responsibility"), departures, or cross-references, except for those specifically agreed in Paragraphs VI (B) (1)-(6), above.
- 8. Variances or Deviations: Both parties stipulate and agree not to move for, or argue in support of, any variance or deviance from the Sentencing Guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In the event the defendant or his attorney makes any argument to the United States Probation Office or to the Court for a deviation or variance from the Sentencing Guidelines, or for any other reduction of sentence, the defendant will have materially breached this Plea Agreement. United States v. Salerno, 81 F.3d 1453, 1462 (9th Cir. 1996). "Where a defendant has breached a plea agreement, courts have found the government to be free from its obligations." United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir.1997)

VII.

WAIVERS

A. Waiver of Constitutional Rights: The defendant understands that by pleading guilty he is waiving the following constitutional

rights:

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- 1. Public and Speedy Trial: If defendant were to continue with his plea of not guilty to the charges in the indictment, he would be entitled to a public and speedy trial.
- 2. Jury Trial, Presumption of Innocence, Unanimous

 Verdict: The defendant has an absolute right to a jury trial. At that trial, the jury would be instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that he carries that presumption throughout the trial until such time as the government overcomes the presumption by evidence adduced at the trial. The jury would be further instructed that it could not convict the defendant unless all twelve jurors agreed that the government had proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 3. Confrontation of Witnesses: At the trial, the defendant would be entitled to see, hear and confront the witnesses and the evidence against him. These witnesses would be testifying under the penalty of perjury and would be subject to cross-examination by the defendant's attorney.
- 4. Compulsory Process: At the trial, the defendant would be entitled to present witnesses and other evidence in his own behalf and, if the witnesses refused to appear voluntarily, the defendant would be entitled to use the court's process to compel their attendance.
- 5. Privilege Against Self Incrimination: At a trial, the defendant would have a privilege against self-incrimination so that he could not be compelled to testify and the jury could be instructed that no inference of guilt could be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify.

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- 6. Right to Appeal: If, after a trial, the defendant were convicted, he would have a right to appeal the conviction.
- 7. Representation of Counsel: The defendant is entitled to be represented by competent counsel through all stages of the case, including appeal, and if the defendant could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him by the court.

Defendant understands that by pleading guilty he is waiving all of the rights set forth above. Defendant's attorney has explained those rights to him and the consequences of his waiver of those rights and defendant freely and voluntarily consents to said waiver.

B. Waiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack: The defendant understands that the law gives him a right to appeal his conviction and sentence. He agrees as part of his plea, however, to give up the right to appeal the conviction. So long as his sentence is no longer than the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range determined by the Court consistent with the stipulations set forth above about the Sentencing Guidelines variables, the defendant also agrees as part of his plea to give up the right to appeal all aspects of the sentence imposed. Defendant specifically gives up his right to appeal any order of restitution the Court may impose.

Regardless of the sentence he receives, the defendant also gives up any right he may have to bring a post-appeal attack on his conviction or his sentence. He specifically agrees not to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241 attacking his conviction or sentence.

If the defendant ever attempts to vacate his plea, dismiss the underlying charges, or reduce or set aside his sentence on any of the counts to which he is pleading guilty, the government shall have

the right (1) to prosecute the defendant on any of the counts to which he pleaded guilty; (2) to reinstate any counts that may be dismissed pursuant to this Plea Agreement; and (3) to file any new charges that would otherwise be barred by this Plea Agreement. The decision to pursue any or all of these options is solely in the discretion of the United States Attorney's Office.

By signing this Plea Agreement, the defendant agrees to waive any objections, motions, and defenses he might have to the government's decision. In particular, he agrees not to raise any objections based on the passage of time with respect to such counts including, but not limited to, any statutes of limitation or any objections based on the Speedy Trial Act or Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

C. Waiver of Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The defendant agrees to waive all rights under the "Hyde Amendment," Section 617, P.L. 105-119 (Nov. 26, 1997), to recover attorneys' fees or other litigation expenses in connection with the investigation and prosecution of all charges in the above-captioned matter and of any related allegations (including without limitation any charges to be dismissed or previously dismissed).

VIII.

ENTIRE PLEA AGREEMENT

Other than this Plea Agreement, no agreement, understanding, promise, or condition between the government and the defendant exists, nor will such agreement, understanding, promise, or condition exist unless it is committed to writing and signed by the defendant, counsel for the defendant, and counsel for the United States.

PLEA AGREEMENT

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DATED:

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APPROVALS AND SIGNATURES

IX.

A. Defense Counsel: I have read this Plea Agreement and have discussed it fully with my client. The Plea Agreement accurately and completely sets forth the entirety of the agreement. I concur in my client's decision to plead guilty as set forth in this Plea Agreement.

DATED: Fcb. 9, 2011

McGregor W. Scott, Attorney for Defendant

B. Defendant: I have read this Plea Agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand it, and I voluntarily agree to it. Further, I have consulted with my attorney and fully understand my rights with respect to the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines that may apply to my case. No other promises or inducements have been made to me, other than those contained in this Plea Agreement. In addition, no one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this Plea Agreement. Finally, I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this case.

Collins Max Christensen, Defendant

C. Attorney for United States: I accept and agree to this Plea Agreement on behalf of the government.

Feb. 10, 2011

BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney

RUSSELL L. CARLBERG Assistant U.S. Attorney

DATED: 2-9-1/

EXHIBIT "A"

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Factual Basis for Plea

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BACKGROUND I.

At all relevant times, defendant COLLINS MAX CHRISTENSEN ("CHRISTENSEN"), a/k/a "COLLIE CHRISTENSEN," managed the operations of land-development companies called Equus 11, Inc., Liquid Blue Assets LLC, Modesto Emerald City LLC, CFG LLC, Eagle's View Development LLC, Reed's Creek LLC, and others. CHRISTENSEN operated these entities out of a business location on Fulton Avenue in Sacramento. CHRISTENSEN controlled bank accounts located in the State and Eastern District of California associated with these entities.

Specifically, CFG LLC was the entity CHRISTENSEN used to manage a multi-purpose land development project in Wiggins, Mississippi (colloquially referred to as "the Wiggins Project" or simply "Wiggins"). Liquid Blue Assets LLC was the entity CHRISTENSEN used to manage a multi-unit condominium time-share venture in Cabo San Lucas (colloquially referred to as "the Cabo Project" or simply "Cabo"). Equus 11 LLC was an entity used also for the Wiggins Project. Modesto Emerald City LLC was the entity CHRISTENSEN used to manage the refurbishing and resale of preexisting residential units in Modesto, California. Reeds Creek LLC, also known as Alfaro Ranch, involved the development of farm land near Yuba City into a mixed-use commercial and residential development project.

From approximately 2006 though 2008, CHRISTENSEN received approximately \$2,385,959 from 14 investors for these projects. time. CHRISTENSEN began to divert money for purposes other than for the stated or intended purposes of each project. Of these investor

funds, CHRISTENSEN misappropriated approximately \$985,994. CHRISTENSEN used the interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme.

II. THE WIGGINS PROJECT

The Wiggins Project was a 121 acre mixed commercial and residential development in a rural area on Highway 49, near Wiggins, Mississippi. CHRISTENSEN represented to investors that the project was located in a "go zone" with favorable tax incentives as part of the rebuilding efforts after Hurricane Katrina. CHRISTENSEN told investors that the project was located in an area where people needed housing after Hurricane Katrina. He also claimed he had commitments from a national retailer in the commercial portion of the project, to be known as "Dizzy Dean Plaza."

From approximately 2006 through 2008, CHRISTENSEN received hundreds of thousands of dollars from investors specifically for the Wiggins Project. He used substantial portions of the funds for purposes unrelated to the Wiggins Project.

On or about May 7, 2008, an investor in the Wiggins Project, identified here as W.K., wired \$240,000 from his Washington Mutual Bank to the account of Eagle's Nest Partners at Wells Fargo Bank in the Eastern District of California. (Eagle's Nest Partners was an entity CHRISTENSEN used to manage personal investments.) This wire transfer was routed through the Fedwire system in East Rutherford, New Jersey. CHRISTENSEN used \$159,556 of these investor funds on personal expenses and other projects (such as the Cabo Project) and not for the intended purpose of investing in Wiggins. Had CHRISTENSEN disclosed to W.K. that these funds were being used for purposes unrelated to the Wiggins Project, W.K. would not have invested the funds.

PLEA AGREEMENT

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PLEA AGREEMENT

III. ALFARO RANCH

CHRISTENSEN solicited an investor for a planned multi-use commercial and residential development on a 1,150 acre plot of farm land known as Alfaro Ranch, near Yuba City, California. CHRISTENSEN falsely told the investor he would use the money for future development of the farm land.

From July 13, 2007 to July 19, 2007, an investor identified here as T.K., a resident of North Dakota, wired \$125,000 from Anchor Bank, located in Wayzata, Minnesota, to the Reeds Creek LLC bank account at Wells Fargo, in Sacramento, State and Eastern District of California. This wire transfer was routed through the Fedwire system in East Rutherford, New Jersey. Rather than applying the funds toward the intended purpose of developing the Alfaro Ranch farm land, CHRISTENSEN immediately diverted the entire sum. Shortly after receiving the funds CHRISTENSEN diverted them to repay debts owed to other entities or for purposes other than investing in the Alfaro Ranch as had been represented to the investor. Within one day of receipt of T.K.'s funds, CHRISTENSEN transferred \$46,900 to pay bills associated with the Cabo Project. The same day, he transferred \$75,000 of T.K.'s money to Eagle's Nest Partners. Had CHRISTENSEN disclosed to T.K. that he would use T.K.'s funds for purposes unrelated to Alfaro Ranch, T.K. would not have invested the funds.

IV. MODESTO EMERALD CITY

CHRISTENSEN originally promoted the Modesto and Cabo developments to investors in Sacramento in or around April 2006. As the project developed, CHRISTENSEN ran into financial difficulties with Modesto and other projects. He did not adequately disclose to latter investors material facts concerning the scope of the financial difficulties the Modesto project was developing.

In 2008, CHRISTENSEN received \$267,000 from four investors for the Modesto Project. Of this \$267,000, CHRISTENSEN misapplied \$68,706 toward bills associated with unrelated investments, such as Wiggins, Cabo, and his own personal real estate investments.

V. DIVERSIFIED WEALTH MANAGEMENT

CHRISTENSEN represented to W.K. that he was in negotiations to become marketing arm for USAREIT through an entity he controlled known as "Diversified Wealth Management." USAREIT is a known entity, separate from CHRISTENSEN, that is involved in substantial private lending. According to CHRISTENSEN, W.K.'s money would be used to staff an office and to pay for start-up costs. On or about March 6, 2007, W.K. gave CHRISTENSEN a Washington Mutual Bank cashier's check in the amount of \$200,000, for the use of Diversified Wealth Management. CHRISTENSEN deposited the check into a Wells Fargo bank account in the name of Diversified Wealth Management. Thereafter, CHRISTENSEN wired \$150,000 of W.K.'s money to Spearhead Group LLC, another project unrelated to Diversified Wealth Management or USA REIT. Had CHRISTENSEN disclosed to W.K. that he would use the funds for purposes unrelated to Diversified Wealth Management and USA REIT, W.K. would not have parted with the money.

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